China’s Growing Spy Threat

China’s
Growing Spy Threat

September 19, 2011By Alex
Newman

The Chinese government’s ‘vacuum cleaner’ approach to
espionage is worrying foreign governments, companies and overseas dissidents.
They’re right to be concerned.

Image credit:yeowatzup

Beijing fiercely denies it. Much of the world ignores it. But according to
analysts and officials, the communist-controlled People’s Republic of China
operates the single largest intelligence-gathering apparatus in the world—and
its growing appetite for secrets has apparently become insatiable.

From economic and military espionage to keeping tabs on exiled dissidents,
China’s global spying operations are rapidly expanding. And, therefore, so is
the threat. Some analysts even argue the regime—which is also gobbling up such
key natural resources as farmland, energy, and minerals—has an eye on dominating
the world.

Estimates on the number of spies and agents employed by the communist state
vary widely. According to public statements by French author and investigative
journalist Roger Faligot, who has written several books about the
regime’s security services, there are around two million Chinese working
directly or indirectly for China’s intelligence apparatus.

Other analysts say it would be impossible to count the exact number. ‘I doubt
they know themselves,’ says Richard Fisher, a senior fellow on Asian military
affairs at the Washington-based International Assessment and Strategy Center.
Regardless, the number is undoubtedly extraordinary. ‘China can rightly claim to
have the world’s largest, most amorphous, but also most active intelligence
sector,’ he says.

That’s partly because it operates very differently from most. ‘When you
consider that China’s intelligence community views any foreign-deployed Chinese
citizen, any Chinese delegation, all Chinese criminal networks, and all overseas
Chinese with any tangible affinity or connection to the Motherland as a target
for recruitment, then you have to find a different way to measure,’ Fisher
explains. ‘This has to start with the consideration that any Chinese, especially
those from China, from student to CEO, are potential active intelligence
assets.’

Other analysts echo his concerns, and a simple fact: the regime’s spies are
increasingly active across the globe. Since 2008, more and more
intelligence-training colleges—‘spy schools’—have been popping up at
universities across the country. Meanwhile, Chinese satellite-reconnaissance and
cyber espionage capabilities are expanding at an unprecedented speed.

Officials are, probably for good reason, skittish when discussing China and
its intelligence collection operations. But there’s near unanimous agreement—and
court convictions in countries around the globe support the premise—that, in
terms of sophistication, scope, and international capabilities, the perils of
Chinese espionage are on the rise.

‘The danger is pronounced,’ warns Charles Viar, chairman of the Washington,
D.C.-based Center for Intelligence Studies. ‘In my view, no one is really doing
enough to deal with the Chinese threat. It is too large, and by Western
standards, too unconventional.’

Among the array of growing dangers associated with Chinese spying: the
regime’s increasingly advanced cyber capabilities. While the techniques are used
to steal ever more information of all sorts, the potential for devastating
offensive operations exists as well. Leaked US diplomatic cables and
cyber-security analysts suggest that Chinese military intelligence has been
involved in countless network penetrations in recent years. In some instances,
evidence suggests that the regime is even able to remotely control sensitive
systems.

Consider one example: In 2009, senior US officials reported that cyber
spies—at least some of whom were Chinese—infiltrated the US electrical grid. And after breaking in,
they left software behind that could be used to cause disruptions or possibly
even shut the system down.

The Evolution of the Menace

Though the evolving threats are more advanced and dangerous today than ever
before, Chinese espionage is nothing new. In fact, it began centuries ago—well
before the communist regime rose to power.

‘China has a history of organized intelligence-gathering operations that goes
back to the 15th century—perhaps even earlier,’ says Joseph Fitsanakis, a senior
editor with Intel News who teaches classes on espionage, intelligence, and
covert action at King College’s Department of History and Political Science. The
Chinese, however, took it to a new level.

Up until two to three decades ago, the regime’s spying was largely domestic
in nature, Fitsanakis explains—primarily targeting perceived enemies and
dissidents within China. But in the post-1980s era, with economic reforms and
growing affluence pacifying much of the internal unrest, Chinese intelligence
collection efforts began to focus more on the outside world.

Today, according to experts and former counterintelligence officials, Chinese
spying represents one of the largest threats to US security. And the sheer size
of the regime’s espionage apparatus ‘is proving a good match for the more
advanced automated systems used by its less populous regional rivals, including
Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan,’ adds Fitsanakis.

Public awareness of the hidden menace is indeed on the rise. But available
evidence indicates that the danger is still underestimated—and growing
quickly.

‘The Chinese are the biggest problem we have with respect to the level of
effort that they’re devoting against us versus the level of attention we are
giving to them,’ former US counterintelligence chief Michelle Van Cleave told CBS during an interview. Officials with the US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), meanwhile, labelled China’s
‘aggressive and wide-ranging espionage’ the ‘leading threat to US
technology.’

According to former Chinese intelligence officials who defected to the West,
the United States is indeed China’s main target for espionage. But as China
steps up its spying around the world, it’s becoming clear that no nation,
company, military, or exiled dissident is immune.

Espionage & Influence

Like the intelligence services of most large and powerful countries, a
significant segment of China’s spying apparatus is devoted to collecting
information on foreign governments—particularly in terms of their military and
political systems. Vast numbers of Chinese spies have been caught stealing such
secrets.

In fact, it’s known that the regime has already acquired some of the United
States’ most sensitive secrets. A US Congressional Committee and then-Director
of National Intelligence George Tenet found as early as the late-1990s that China had even
obtained information on the United States’ most advanced nuclear
weapons
.

That’s not all. ‘China has managed to gather a great deal of information on
US stealth technology, naval propulsion systems, electronic warfare systems, and
nuclear weapons through espionage,’ says Larry Wortzel, a commissioner and
former chairman on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and the
ex-director of the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. ‘That is
documented in convictions in US courts.’

The regime, however, wants more. A few Chinese espionage cases have made
headlines recently, such as the scandal involving former weapons analyst Gregg Bergersen with
the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency. A leaked video of him selling
sensitive information about US military collaboration with Taiwan—a nation which
the communist regime considers a breakaway territory—sparked a new level of
public interest in Chinese espionage just last year.

But most cases barely cause a stir. According to an analysis of US Justice
Department records by the Associated Press, there have been at least 58
defendants charged in federal court for China-related espionage since 2008. Most
have been convicted, while the rest are awaiting trial or on the run. Hundreds
of investigations are ongoing.

A leaked diplomatic cable from the US embassy in Santiago, Chile, also
revealed that US officials were worried about Chinese espionage against the US
military even in Latin America. ‘There’s concern that the Chinese could be using
Chilean officers and access to the Army training school to learn more about
joint programs, priorities, and techniques that the Chileans have developed with
their US counterparts,’ noted the 2005 cable signed by then-Ambassador Craig
Kelly, adding that even Chinese journalists were ‘assumed’ to be involved in
some kind of collection activity.

‘(A)s the (US government) augments its support to the Chilean Armed Forces,
Chinese interest in USG activities in the Southern Cone will most assuredly
increase,’ according to the document released earlier this year by WikiLeaks. ‘The Chinese
will likely attempt to learn more about US military strategies and techniques
via Chilean participation in bilateral training programs and joint
exercises.’

And while experts agree that the United States is the single most important
target, Chinese agents involved in military and political espionage have been
convicted all over the world. In late July, for example, Taiwanese General Lo
Hsien-che was sentenced to life in prison for handing over military secrets to
Beijing. The case shocked the nation. But it wasn’t necessarily surprising to
some observers.

‘Anyone who has followed developments in Taiwan over the years knows how
deeply Chinese forces have infiltrated Taiwan’s military, especially its senior
officers,’ noted Taiwan-based journalist and security analyst J. Michael Cole in
a recent opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal. He
noted that, because Taiwan is so infested with Chinese spies, any US weapons
sales to the nation could result in sensitive military secrets ending up in
Beijing.

Europe isn’t immune either. In Belgium, headquarters of NATO and the European
Union, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Foreign Affairs separately
accused China of cyber spying and attempting to compromise critical government
networks in 2008. The next year, reports of
Chinese intelligence efforts
directed at top Australian officials, including
the prime minister, made headlines worldwide.

Even in Russia, widely considered at least a tenuous ally of the Chinese
regime, Chinese spies have been convicted in recent years. One man, Igor
Reshetin, was found guilty of providing information useful in designing nuclear
missiles to a Chinese state-owned firm. In early September, Russian prosecutors
charged two more academics with selling military secrets to China.

Aside from stealing political and military information, another important
goal of Chinese intelligence agents is to gain influence among members of a
target country’s political elite. According to experts, China uses bribes,
blackmail, women, lavish vacations in China, and other means to compromise
officials worldwide.

Even former US President Bill Clinton was widely accused of being too close to Beijing for comfort.
‘President Clinton promised to restrain those who ordered the Tiananmen Square
massacre, but he has now allowed these men whose hands are stained with the
blood of martyrs of freedom into the highest reaches of our military defences,
and made available to them significant portions of our advanced military
technology,’ charged former US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Thomas
Moorer in a letter to congressional leaders.

Indeed, one of the prime targets of Chinese intelligence, according to
analysts, is information to create comprehensive databases on current and future
leaders of free countries. ‘They want to arm their diplomats and businessmen
with the inside scoop to be able to expand their political and economic allies
to help foster ruling elites that will never challenge the legitimacy of the
Chinese Communist regime,’ says Fisher.

In Canada, the issue was raised just last year. During a TV interview,
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director Richard Fadden suggested
that some politicians in Canada were connected to certain foreign
governments—almost universally assumed to mean China.

After causing an uproar among some sectors, however, the Canadian spy chief
tried to downplay the remarks. ‘He was very rapidly shut down by some
irresponsible—almost suspicious’—officials, who denied that there was any
problem, says Michel Juneau-Katsuya, the former Asia-Pacific head of CSIS.

‘Actually, Mr. Fadden was talking about something that has been happening for
decades,’ Juneau-Katsuya says. The strategy of gaining influence among foreign
power brokers is an important tool in China’s espionage arsenal, he says. It’s
also one that is rarely discussed.

Theft of Trade Secrets

The theft of trade secrets, technology, and corporate information is another
one of China’s specialties. ‘When it comes to economic espionage, China is
universally recognized as at the top,’ says Juneau-Katsuya, who now serves as
the CEO of security consulting firm The Northgate Group. ‘What we know is that,
by far, they are at the top when it comes to stealing information.’

Oftentimes the line between military and economic espionage is blurry. The case of engineer Dongfan ‘Greg’ Chung, sentenced last year, is
just one example among many. Chung was caught passing sensitive US aerospace and
rocket secrets to China that he stole while working for defence contractors
Boeing and Rockwell International.

In other cases, the foreign technology stolen by Chinese spies is used to
further oppress the population. A revealing lawsuit filed by US software maker Cybersitter,
seeking more than $2 billion in damages, accused China and other conspirators of
stealing its proprietary filtering code. The software was then apparently used
to help censor the web in China.

‘They have a multitude of goals all at once: To catch up on the difference in
technology, to gain influence around the world, to know more about where the
competition is, and definitely to not have to pay for research and development,’
says Juneau-Katsuya. The R&D element is key.

Often, the motivation for stealing trade secrets is purely economic. In
addition to saving unfathomable amounts of time and capital, using stolen
information crucial to a company’s survival can actually lead to shutting down
China’s foreign competition.

So, partly because the return on investment from spying is so much greater
than from R&D, experts say the budgets of Chinese intelligence agencies have
soared in recent years. That trend is expected to continue indefinitely.

But while it may be cost effective for China, the price tag paid by others is
massive. Precise figures are, of course, impossible to calculate. But in 1995,
when Juneau-Katsuya was at CSIS, he tried to get an estimate: It was somewhere
in the neighbourhood of $10 billion to $12 billion per year. Since then the
problem has only grown.

In Germany, the cost is high, too, Berthold Stoppelkamp of the German
Association for Security in Industry and Commerce (ASW) told the press in 2009.
He estimated the damages from economic espionage—primarily Russian and
Chinese—at around €20 billion every year. But it could be closer to €50 billion,
he noted.

An estimate on the cost of economic espionage to the US economy was offered
by FBI Director Robert Mueller in 2003: over $250 billion per year. And
counterintelligence officials with the Bureau and other experts agree that China
is by far the most serious threat.

‘This espionage saps US companies of their industrial lead in the new
technologies and materials,’ notes Wortzel. ‘And often the Chinese incorporate
what they have learned into new weapon systems that can be used against the US,
its allies, and friends.’

And because the threat is continually evolving and comes from multiple
directions, it’s difficult to deal with, experts say. China uses all known means
of stealing information even as it develops ever more ingenious schemes.

Traditional methods, such as infiltrating companies and compromising existing
employees, are still widely used. Academic and educational institutions play a
crucial role as well—as do the regime’s ‘front companies’ set up in the United
States, estimated to number in the thousands by the FBI. Foreign companies with
operations in China are said to be particularly vulnerable to losing their
secrets.

Meanwhile, more advanced tools like computer hacking are becoming an
increasingly important weapon in the regime’s economic-spying arsenal. ‘Their
cyber activities have increased in the last ten years quite significantly,’ says
Juneau-Katsuya. ‘They are devoting university departments and entire sections of
the (People’s Liberation Army) just to that.’

Another key but underestimated strategy employed in China’s quest for trade
secrets—corporate acquisitions and joint ventures—makes use of the regime’s vast
empire of well-funded, state-owned companies. By purchasing even a significant
percentage of a firm, China often obtains important technological know-how. It
also buys political influence.

‘China continues to leverage foreign investments, commercial joint ventures,
academic exchanges, the experience of repatriated Chinese students and
researchers, and state-sponsored industrial/technical espionage to increase the
level of technologies and expertise available to support military research,
development, and acquisition,’ notes a 2011 US Defense Department report to
Congress on Chinese military and security developments.

Especially following the recent recession, the Chinese regime has been on a
global shopping spree using its vast cash reserves—buying up all sorts of
companies, from car manufacturers to technology enterprises. But countless
examples of the use of this tactic have been documented for well over a
decade.

Even more alarming for some: A secret 1997 investigation by
CSIS and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police entitled ‘Sidewinder’ found that
criminal networks affiliated with Chinese intelligence were also intimately
involved. The Canadian government essentially dismissed the report, but many
analysts believe the collaboration has only grown since then.

In general, firms and universities are simply not doing enough to protect
their secrets and technology from China, says Center for Intelligence Studies
Chairman Charles Viar. ‘That said, the larger problem involves contractual
agreements in which Western companies voluntarily transfer sensitive
technologies—often illegally—in order to win contracts with China,’ he points
out.

Fisher has similar concerns. He says firms and educational institutions
around the world are not simply targets—in many cases they have become
‘compliant victims’ of Chinese intelligence agencies’ designs.

‘Companies and universities must first reach an understanding of how they are
aiding and abetting the Chinese Communist dictatorship,’ says Fisher, noting
that as long as they crave Chinese money, they will continue bending over
backwards to satisfy the regime. ‘This scandal is compounded by the fact that
Chinese allies in the capitals of most democracies are succeeding in avoiding or
averting the level of critical review that would also lead to defensive
action.’

Persecuting Dissidents, Even Abroad

One of the top priorities of Chinese espionage efforts—foreign and
domestic—is monitoring and disrupting dissidents, according to defectors,
experts, and official documents. In the crosshairs overseas are Chinese
democracy activists, Tibetans, the exiled Uighur community, Falun Gong
practitioners, supporters of Taiwanese independence, and countless
others—essentially anybody who disagrees with the regime or paints a negative
image of it abroad.

In 2009, for example, a massive and sophisticated cyber espionage network was
discovered by Canadian researchers. The system, known as ‘GhostNet,’ had reportedly penetrated computers belonging to
multiple governments, the exiled Dalai Lama, and a number of other dissidents
and critics. Investigators traced the operation to China.

Last year, after a ‘highly sophisticated and targeted attack’ originating in
China, Google announced that a primary goal of the operation was to gain access
to Chinese human rights activists’ e-mail accounts. ‘Dozens’ of such accounts
had already been compromised through other means before the attack in question,
the company also said in a statement.

It’s not just human rights campaigners and pro-Tibetan activists who are
under constant attack, however. Among the most viciously persecuted are
individuals associated with Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa. The spiritual
and philosophical movement was banned by the Communist regime in 1999 after
officialdom decided it might represent a threat to the Communist Party.

Labelling it an ‘evil cult,’ China then created an extra-legal apparatus
known as the 6-10 Office to quash the discipline domestically—and around the
world. An unprecedented campaign of terror and brainwashing has since been
unleashed, including a vast network of ‘re-education’ camps, disappearances,
torture, harvesting organs from practitioners, and more.

And the regime’s tentacles have truly spread worldwide in pursuit of its
goal. ‘The war against Falun Gong is one of the main tasks of the Chinese
mission overseas,’ Chen Yonglin, a senior official at the Chinese Consulate in
Sydney told a US Congressional committee in 2005 after his defection.

A vast body of evidence, and even recent court cases, support the claim. In
June, for example, a Chinese man in Germany was convicted of spying on members
of the Falun Gong community for China. A few years earlier, a senior Chinese
embassy official in Ottawa was expelled after being caught spying on
practitioners there.

In the United States, officials also regularly highlight the problem. The
House of Representatives has blasted the regime for similar illegal activities
inside the United States on at least four occasions. A House resolution passed
last year and a separate measure adopted in 2004, for instance, recognized the
seriousness of the problem, called for the regime to stop, and urged US
authorities to take action.

According to the resolutions, China’s diplomatic corps is actively ‘harassing
and persecuting’ Chinese dissidents in the United States, breaking into the
homes of prominent activists, pressuring US officials with threats, spreading
lies, and more. In addition to the well-known persecution going on within China,
‘the Chinese Government has also attempted to silence the Falun Gong movement
and Chinese pro-democracy groups inside the United States,’ the measures
state.

More than a few US Representatives have been even more direct. Foreign
Affairs Committee Chair Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), speaking in support of the
resolution, said last year that ‘clear evidence’ shows Chinese diplomats were
colluding with secret agents and ‘thugs’ to suppress the constitutionally
protected rights of Americans. She called on the State Department to ‘get tough’
on the regime’s functionaries within US borders.

‘First is the issue of the penetration of agents of an alien Communist regime
right here inside the United States to wage a campaign of repression against US
citizens,’ Ros-Lehtinen said before the House, citing examples and noting that Chinese
agents were ‘persecuting American Falun Gong practitioners in our own country.’
And the well-documented ‘bloody harvest’ and ‘coercive organ transplants’ from
Falun Gong practitioners within China, she added, ‘is almost too ghoulish to
imagine.’

One prominent analyst on the issue of Falun Gong persecution, David Kilgour,
is a former Canadian member of parliament and served as Canada’s secretary of
state for Asia-Pacific in 2002 and 2003. He recently co-authored a book entitled
‘Bloody Harvest—The killing of Falun Gong for their organs,’ which closely
examines the brutality and takes a look at the regime’s illegal persecution of
exiled practitioners.

‘The espionage and intimidation the party-state deploys against Falun Gong
abroad is outrageous,’ Kilgour says, calling it an extension of the ‘very severe
persecution’ in China. ‘It’s unconscionable for a repressive government to use
the freedom of a democracy to project abroad its persecution of its chosen
victims.’

Among the examples he cites is a 2003 case in which two Chinese diplomatic
officials in Edmonton were caught handing out pamphlets inciting hatred against
the Falun Gong—a crime in Canada. But there’s much more, he says.

Chinese defectors have told Kilgour that the effort spent monitoring and
repressing dissidents overseas actually outweighs all other functions of Chinese
diplomatic missions combined, he says. Apparently the regime doesn’t want the
international community to realize what has been perpetrated in China.

One victim of that persecution, author and human rights activist Jennifer
Zeng, fled China in 2001 after being tortured at one of the regime’s
‘Re-Education-Through-Labour’ camps. ‘The PRC espionage and intimidation against
FG practitioners overseas is so common that many of us have become accustomed to
it,’ she says.

But while Falun Gong practitioners may be at the top of the regime’s list of
perceived enemies, they are far from the only victims of anti-dissident Chinese
operations abroad. Another extensively targeted group is the exiled Uighur
community, an ethnic minority—primarily Muslim—that has been systematically
oppressed within China for decades. China has also been very active in tracking
and disrupting the activities of those who managed to flee.

Last year, for example, a man was convicted of ‘aggravated illegal espionage’
against the Uighur refugee community in Sweden. ‘He reported all he could about
them,’ says Sweden’s chief national security prosecutor Tomas Lindstram, who
prosecuted the case. The information included everything from the targets’
political views and activities to details about their health and travel
habits.

Using a ‘rather tricky’ method to communicate with his handlers—a Chinese
‘journalist’ and a diplomatic official—the convicted spy ‘fooled most of his
fellow countrymen,’ says Lindstram. The court and the prosecutor recognized the
seriousness of the crime—especially because it was to benefit a ‘totalitarian’
government that does not respect human rights. Incredibly, however, the spy was
sentenced to less than two years.

Lindstram admits he thought the short sentence was ‘odd’ and didn’t correctly
account for the severity of the crime. The government is now apparently looking
into the sentencing length question. But for many Uighur activists, the penalty
was almost an outrage.

‘There should be a tougher punishment for a crime like this in order to send
a strong signal to other possible spies around the world,’ says Mehmet Tohti,
the Special Representative of the World Uighur Congress to the European Union.
And it isn’t just Sweden that could use improvement.

Tohti says the West in general isn’t doing enough to protect and support
exiled Chinese dissidents—even though it is in the free world’s own interest to
do so. In Germany, for example, there have also been several incidents of
Chinese espionage against Uighurs in recent years. Little has been done.

‘Chinese spying is a big problem for the Uighur community—especially for
Uighur organizational leaders,’ says Tohti. But they are hardly alone.

Other victims of Chinese intimidation, wiretapping, and e-mail theft—Tibetan
activists and pro-democracy advocates, for example—are fiercely persecuted by
the regime outside of China, too. According to Tohti, one of the goals is to
minimize the impact of anti-China protests because they are ‘exposing China’s
gross and systematic violation of human rights’ to the world.

Beyond Intelligence: Offensive Capabilities

Chinese intelligence agencies are clearly involved in collecting information
on a massive scale. Some analysts even refer to the regime’s strategy as the
‘Vacuum Cleaner’ approach. But intelligence gathering is only one piece of the
puzzle.

Perhaps even more alarming than monitoring dissidents and stealing trade
secrets, analysts say, is mounting evidence of the regime’s increasing ability
and willingness to employ its spy services offensively. The number of examples
is growing rapidly.

In the cyber realm, China’s use of offensive tactics was highlighted again
just last month. As The Diplomat reported on August 25, a video on cyber warfare broadcast over
China’s military state TV channel included a brief segment that raised eyebrows
worldwide.

The footage apparently showed an old computer programme from the People’s
Liberation Army Electronic Engineering Institute being used to ‘attack’ a
US-based website tied to the Falun Gong via a US university’s network. And,
while the short clip featured outdated and unsophisticated methodology, analysts
say it was important for several reasons—providing more evidence of China’s
offensive cyber activities being chief among them.

A 2009 report prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission on China’s cyber capabilities also suggests that the regime’s
information-warfare strategy features offensive operations prominently.
According to the authors’ analysis of the regime’s strategy, the tools ‘will be
widely employed in the earliest phases of a conflict, and possibly
pre-emptively.’

The study also notes that faculty members at China’s National University of
Defense Technology ‘are actively engaged in research on offensive network
operations techniques or exploits.’ Research and development on ‘a variety of
offensive information warfare technologies’ is also being conducted by
institutes overseen by the PLA’s General Staff Department Fourth Department.

Another area of concern is covert Chinese activism overseas. ‘Their
objectives know no limit,’ says Fisher. ‘If China has targeted a country for its
resources and has decided to sustain a noisome regime to defend those interests,
it will give that regime the means to, as it will also collect a comprehensive
data base to help that regime to avoid threats.’

This strategy—secretly propping up friendly dictators—was illustrated
recently when China was apparently caught quietly arming Gaddafi after the civil war
in Libya began. In violation of international sanctions, China was reportedly
offering weapons to the Libyan dictator even in the final weeks of battle,
documents leaked in early September indicate.

The move—a carefully calculated risk, to be sure—clearly required intimate
knowledge of potential US and NATO reactions. ‘This kind of very targeted power
projection will become the order of the day when China builds its power
projection Navy and Air Force, due to come online by the early 2020s,’ Fisher
warns.

And even though Gaddafi’s regime may have crumbled, he notes, China has a
growing international network of support, including the regimes ruling North
Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Other key players in the
Chinese intelligence community’s expanding network of friends are global
criminal organizations and freelance cyber warriors—or ‘sub-contractors’ and
‘pirates,’ as Fisher refers to them.

Links with organized crime and so-called ‘Patriotic hackers’ allow the regime some degree of plausible
deniability in covert operations and cyber attacks. But between backing
socialist strongmen, penetrating critical infrastructure, and sabotaging
computer systems, China’s aggressive foreign intelligence operations are
increasingly arousing suspicion worldwide.

According to Juneau-Katsuya, the overall designs aren’t all that complex. ‘If
you want to understand the strategy that Chinese intelligence and the Chinese
government are using, you’ve got to refer yourself to the game of Go,’ he says,
noting that it is popular among China’s military top brass.

The ancient game is fairly simple: The object is to encircle one’s opponent
and take control of the most territory. ‘That’s exactly the strategy they’re
using,’ Juneau-Katsuya says, citing the regime’s increasingly active presence
around the world—particularly in Africa—as an example of the plan in action.

Guarding against the Threat

There’s some disagreement among experts about whether governments are doing
enough to protect themselves and their people from the threat of Chinese
espionage. But overwhelmingly, insiders say nations from Canada and Australia to
European states and India need to do more—much more. Small countries in the
vicinity of China are probably among the most vulnerable.

Regardless, what is certain, according to analysts, is that most companies
and institutions aren’t keeping up with the Chinese regime’s rapidly evolving
espionage capabilities. And the PRC is taking full advantage of the
opportunities.

‘They understand very well that the Western world is sleeping at the switch
when it comes to all this, and the majority of people are not paying attention
to the security of their systems,’ says Juneau-Katsuya. ‘That is the weakest
link.’

FBI spokesman Bill Carter says that after terrorism, counterintelligence ‘is
the number two priority in the FBI, and significant resources are devoted to our
counterespionage activities.’ The exact figures are classified, he adds. ‘You
don’t like to tell the opposition what your capabilities are.’

The US Department of Justice didn’t respond to requests for comment. Neither
did Japan’s Public Security Intelligence Agency. But reports do suggest that at
least some governments are getting serious about counterintelligence and the
threat of Chinese espionage.

Many more governments, for example, have recently started to take action
against state-owned Chinese firms attempting to buy up sensitive or strategic
companies. And growing concerns about using Chinese technology—especially in the
realm of telecommunications—have been expressed by officials around the
world.

By raising public awareness of their plight, the fears of exiled dissidents
are being taken more seriously, too. The victims of the Communist regime’s
foreign persecution, however, still say much more needs to be done.

Strategies to deal with the threat proposed by analysts interviewed by
The Diplomat varied widely, from restricting the number of Chinese
nationals allowed into other countries to developing new multilateral
institutions to address the problem. More resources dedicated to
counterintelligence, tougher punishments for convicted spies, better encryption
systems, and more private sector involvement were also all mentioned.

But one point in particular was repeated over and over again. By far the most
crucial element in the battle, analysts say, is greater awareness.

Alex Newman is a freelance writer and correspondent for The New American
magazine

http://the-diplomat.com/2011/09/19/chinas-growing-spy-threat/

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FlowerOfTheHeart@hotmail.com ஐ 精彩代理看真实世界 ஐ 突..破..网..络..封..锁,可于此下载免费软件: http://sdrv.ms/OoAbld (软件已崁入word文件内) https://sites.google.com/site/freegatebbs/ 自2004年12月3日起退党(/团/队)人数: 125,607,496(http://tuidang.epochtimes.com/) [请用破网软件进入] 《九评共产党》 http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/nf3541.htm [请用破网软件进入]
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